揭仲的國防與中共軍事專題研究

在111年國防部預算書中，卻於「年度重要施政計畫」中，明白指出國軍的防衛作戰構想，已調整為「戰力防護、聯合制海、聯合國土防衛」。雖然國防部在預算書中並未詳細闡述新版防衛作戰構想的內容，但初步仍可發現下列二大問題 :

首先，修改前的「戰力防護、濱海決勝、灘岸殲敵」，突顯的是國軍在台澎防衛作戰時，被認為最具重要性的三個場景，而非按先後順序列出防衛作戰的各階段。但修改後的「戰力防護、聯合制海、聯合國土防衛」，非常接近發言人史順文少將7月2日所說的「防衛作戰階段」，但「聯合防空」卻又消失不見。這樣的修改，很難不引起新版防衛作戰構想不重視、或忽略聯合防空作戰重要性的質疑。

第二，李喜明時代的「戰力防護、濱海決勝、灘岸殲敵」，其實影響最大的是國軍戰力整建方向，就是將武器採購與研發等「軍事投資」預算的重點，在一定程度上朝「機動、隱匿、快速、價廉、量多、損小、效高」之「不對稱戰力」轉變。而調整後的新版防衛作戰構想，似乎代表國軍戰力整建的重點，又朝強調「基本戰力」的方向轉變。

但國軍在106年至111年短短五年內，二度大幅調整戰力整建方向，在國軍重大軍事投資從建案到執行完畢往往費時好幾年的情況下，此種作法等於在短時間內同時追求「不對稱戰力」和「基本戰力」的大幅成長，直接導致「軍事投資」預算膨脹，甚至超過國家年度稅收所能支撐的範圍。

陸軍司令部111年預算中，不僅首度載明陸軍將推動「兵力成長」政策，也預備在111年內，完成「陸軍後續兵力結構規劃」及「陸軍各級部隊兵力組織調整」等配套措施的計畫作為。這些措施代表國軍地面部隊組織結構可能會在未來數年內，進行相當幅度的調整。

雖然陸軍司令部未在預算書中詳細說明相關內容，但未來數年已知空軍將增編1個聯隊以接收66架F-16C/D Block70戰鬥機；海軍也將擴編岸基飛彈部隊來接收100套岸置魚叉飛彈系統，還將擴編潛艦部隊以接收國造潛艦；通資電軍指揮部也可能擴編；在各方都要增加人力的情況下，不知陸軍「兵力成長」的人力從何而來？是否代表國軍現行維持已久的21萬5000人總員額，未來將進行擴充？

#防衛作戰構想 #整體防衛構想 #國防預算 #特別預算 #不對稱戰力 #基本戰力

Abstract:

In writings on logistics mobilization, mainland Chinese academics use the term “large-scale joint operations” to refer to possible use of force against Taiwan. To cope with the resulting challenges for materiel supply support, medical service support, and transportation and delivery support, communist China lists the Eastern Theater Command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a “basic mobilization area,” which will launch full mobilization in all areas and spheres. Provinces and cities near the Eastern TC are “auxiliary mobilization areas,” which mobilize personnel and resources to compensate for the basic mobilization area’s resource deficiencies. In addition, “specific mobilization” covering businesses such as information, transportation, materials supply, medical service, construction, and energy will be launched across mainland China. Other theaters where “chain reaction warfare” is possible are categorized as “stand-by areas for mobilization,” with target-specific mobilization in limited areas, such as homeland air defense, border defense, maintenance of social order, production of military items, and evacuation of people. The aim is to ensure that armed conflicts and disruptive activities incited by domestic and hostile elements overseas will be effectively neutralized.

Judging from publicly available research and observation of the PLA’s joint logistics support and mobilization systems performance in the fight against the new coronavirus pandemic, we believe that the PLA’s logistics support capabilities for “large-scale joint operations,” whether in materiel supply support, medical service support, or transportation and delivery support, are currently insufficient to reach the goal of “fighting a quick battle for a quick result.” The PLA has taken extensive measures to enhance its logistics mobilization capacity to meet the requirements of “fighting a quick battle for a quick result” in “large-scale joint operations” against Taiwan. These include 12 categories: building theater joint operations logistics support network, completing the construction of a support base system, strengthening the mobile support force, boosting military logistics capacity build-up, establishing informatized joint logistics support capability, upgrading the capability to rescue and evacuate the wounded, improving trans-regional transportation and delivery capability, bringing to perfection the examination of national defense potential, establishing a “pre-positioning mobilization” mechanism, expanding new types of militia and the scale of mobilization of businesses, building an advanced national defense mobilization command information system, and consolidating civil-military integration.

Keywords: large-scale joint operations, PLA reform, provincial military district, joint logistics support force, mobilization, invasion