中共外交部發言人毛寧6月2日的談話，極可能意味著中共不排除利用這個事件，持續對日菲二國施壓，希望能迫使日菲二國就劃界所衍生的相關事宜，與中共、而非我方談判，建立其管轄權及於臺灣東部海域的新事證；並進一步藉區域各國是與北京談判的事實，將原本僅針對臺灣的矮化性法律戰，轉變為針對中華民國國際人格的國際性法律戰。
中共也很可能想藉機以抗議、反制日菲片面談判劃界為由，開始派海警船編隊，以每個月至少幾次、每次至少持續一定時間的模式，常態化進入台灣東面、我方專屬經濟海域卻遭日菲納入談判範圍的海域巡弋。換言之，中共想利用此一情形，伺機建立在臺灣東部、我方依《國際海洋法公約》主張的專屬經濟海域範圍，常態化巡弋甚至執法等「管轄」的事實，將侵蝕我方管轄權的法律戰行動範圍，擴張到臺灣東部我方的專屬經濟區海域。(圖片擷取自風傳媒網頁)
The remarks made by Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning(毛寧) on June 2 likely indicate that the China does not exclude the possibility of using this event to continue applying pressure on Japan and the Philippines. The aim is to compel these two countries to negotiate related matters arising from the delimitation with the China, rather than with Taiwan, thereby establishing new evidence of its jurisdiction in the eastern waters of Taiwan. Furthermore, by leveraging the fact that regional countries are negotiating with Beijing, this could transform the originally Taiwan-targeted degrading legal warfare into an international legal warfare aimed at undermining the international persona of the Republic of China.
The China may also seek to use this opportunity to protest against and counter the unilateral delimitation negotiations by Japan and the Philippines by beginning to deploy Coast Guard vessels in a manner that normalizes their patrols in the waters off Taiwan’s eastern coast—areas that Taiwan claims as its EEZ but which have been included in the negotiation scope by Japan and the Philippines. In other words, the China aims to exploit this situation to establish a routine presence of patrols and even law enforcement within the scope of Taiwan’s EEZ in the eastern waters, thereby expanding the legal warfare actions that erode Taiwan’s jurisdiction into these areas.
Chung Chieh(揭仲) provided an example, stating that the P&A data is equivalent to a quotation submitted by potential vendors, while the LOA draft is the contract draft during formal negotiations between the two parties. Both sides can negotiate the items, amounts, and payment milestones in the LOA draft before finalizing and signing it. Once the LOA is signed, the U.S. government will represent the purchasing country in subsequent processes such as vendor selection, negotiation, production, and delivery.
The advantage of this system is that the U.S. government will execute project management for the purchasing country; however, the downside is that it excludes certain clauses found in general commercial contracts, such as dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms, primarily to facilitate the operations of U.S. administrative departments.
He noted that prior to Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, the U.S. insisted that Taiwan’s military procurement procedures must begin with a request for P&A. If the U.S. agreed to provide P&A, it would signify interdepartmental review and consent to sell. Taiwan would then plan its budget and apply for the LOR for LOA based on the P&A. However, since 2016, the U.S. has allowed Taiwan to skip the P&A stage and directly apply for the LOA draft when necessary.
He interpreted that the M1A2T budget exceeding nearly 5 billion NTD is due to the Army’s procurement process for the M1A2T, which aimed to expedite the project by skipping the LOR for P&A stage and relying on price data previously presented in a military exchange meeting. This approach overlooked significant price fluctuations over the years without obtaining a formal quotation, resulting in an underestimated budget. (圖片擷取自聯合報數位版)
/https://vip.udn.com/vip/story/121160/9544803?from=vipudn_maincate_main2
Chung Chieh (揭仲) indicated that further actions should not be ruled out, including more frequent incursions by Chinese Coast Guard vessels into Taiwan’s eastern waters. The heightened activity aims to create opportunities for negotiations with Japan and the Philippines. Taiwan also has the right to assert its claims over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and should negotiate with Japan and the Philippines, emphasizing the necessity of defending its interests.
——-
On June 2, Chung Chieh (揭仲), an adjunct assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, analyzed for the Central News Agency that Chinese Coast Guard vessels have previously operated in Taiwan’s eastern waters. Beijing is using this incident to strengthen its patrol intensity, aiming to engage in a legal battle against Taiwan by asserting “One China” across the Taiwan Strait and claiming sovereignty and jurisdiction over Taiwan.
He noted that Beijing has been working to eliminate jurisdictional gaps in its claims, such as areas east of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and restricted waters around Taiwan’s offshore islands. Through this incident, Beijing aims to establish precedents for exercising jurisdiction in the relevant maritime areas via actual actions such as patrols; the emphasis on “first independent actions” serves more of a propaganda purpose.
Chung Chieh(揭仲) stated that the backbone of the Taiwanese military’s artillery in the future will consist of 111 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), 60 M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, and several International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (IFATDS). If the Ministry of National Defense confirms this year to send a combined arms battalion and regional command to form a brigade command group to participate in the annual “Western Strike” field artillery and high-intensity combat exercises in the U.S., the intention should be to enable Taiwanese field troops and command personnel to gain an in-depth understanding of modern ground combat dynamics and processes.
Chung Chieh(揭仲) believes that sending field troops and command officers to the U.S. for the “Western Strike” exercises before acquiring the M109A7 self-propelled howitzers and IFATDS will not only shorten the time required for these units to become combat-ready once the equipment arrives but will also allow the Taiwanese ground forces and field commanders to practically understand how the kill chain in modern ground combat operates and the extent of current deficiencies within the Taiwanese military. This experience will enable these personnel to return home as advocates for innovation, accelerating the reform and modernization of the army.
Furthermore, Chung Chieh(揭仲) recommended that, given the severe inadequacy of artillery firing ranges on the main island of Taiwan, and considering the significantly increased range of the M142 HIMARS and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, it is difficult to conduct live-fire training under tactical scenarios on Taiwanese land. Therefore, the Ministry of National Defense should negotiate with the U.S. to adopt a model similar to that of the Air Force’s Luke Air Force Base, retaining some M142 HIMARS and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers in the U.S. Each year, personnel could be sent to the U.S. to utilize these retained assets for advanced tactical training and testing. This approach would not only enhance training effectiveness and assimilate new knowledge but also deepen bilateral exchanges between ground forces. (Image sourced from the digital edition of the United Daily News.)
至於川普為何游移不定，除對等關稅失效與美伊戰爭懸而未決，使華府談判地位受挫；更重要的是中共看準川普因美伊戰爭導致國內支持率下挫、連共和黨的基本盤都受衝擊的情況下，使川普能否從北京帶回大單，對提振共和黨期中選舉選情的重要性上升；加上到今年底前，包括9月24日習近平回訪華府，川普和習近平預計將再碰面三次，使中共可藉由將大筆採購清單分階段承諾、分階段兌現的方式，對今年底前的美台政治與軍事交流，包括軍售，獲致令白宮難以忽視的影響力。
除200架波音客機與重新開放美國牛肉比較明確，其餘僅是意願表達，後續還需經過一系列的磋商，逐步將農產品、石油、液化天然氣和能源的採購明細與數量明確化，才能對共和黨期中選舉的選情產生助益；川普之所以建議習近平9月24日造訪華府，也是考量習若同意，在出發前有可能讓前述採購清單明確化，當作給川普的伴手禮；將時間訂在9月中下旬，是為了有足夠的時間，將這些大單的效應轉化為選票。
值得注意的是，客機、發動機、農產品與能源採購所影響的區域，多數是川普及共和黨的基本盤；且共和黨目前在總數435席的聯邦眾議院佔有220席，只比民主黨的215席多出5席，比過半數所需的218席更僅多出2席。倘若共和黨於11月3日聯邦眾議員全數改選時，在基本盤與原本具優勢的選區意外輸掉3席，就將失去對眾議院的控制。使中共的大單效應可否在9月底前開始發酵，就可能對共和黨能否繼續掌控參眾兩院、即川普能否繼續「完全執政」，造成直接的影響。(圖片擷取自風傳媒網頁)
揭仲認為，川普的發言影響，應該遠不及杜魯門對華關係白皮書、1978年中美斷交等重要歷史轉折。揭仲解釋，目前的轉變，很大程度來自川普的個人風格，在美中長期戰略競爭態勢難以改變的大環境下，等川普卸任就可能出現調整，未必會像那些歷史事件一樣，對之後很長一段時間的美中台三邊互動造成深遠影響，甚至成為華府的政策框架。但揭仲也提醒，中國之後一定會援引此次川普總統與習近平詳細討論對台軍售的先例，不斷要求後續的美國政府比照辦理，使這個改變確實比較可能長期化，但只要沒有落實為文字的聯合聲明或公報，後續的美國政府還是有許多彈性可以應對。
另一方面，美國貿易代表葛里爾受訪時提到，過去包括歐巴馬和小布希等前任美國總統，也有暫停軍售的先例，強調川普必須權衡許多因素。揭仲指出，從老布希總統到歐巴馬總統，美國在對台軍售方面，基本上都維持二大特點：第一，避免出售可讓台灣具備跨海打擊中國大陸陸地的武器系統，連技術輸出也設限；第二，在軍售程序上，為符合「非邦交國」身分所做的差異化處理，例如台灣不能隨時向美國提出軍售申請，華府對台灣的軍售申請也不會「隨收隨審」。這二大限制，到川普第一個任期內才明顯改變，至此美國對台軍售程序才基本「正常化」，我方可隨時透過美國在台協會提出軍售申請，華府收到後也會「隨收隨審」。
揭仲解讀，葛里爾所稱小布希與歐巴馬時期的「暫停軍售」，指的應是當年美國政府並未採「隨到隨審」，而是累積到一定程度時一次宣布，因此從2008到2016的馬英九政府時期，美方只宣布4次對台軍售，每次的項目、數額都很龐大，對於宣布的時機也會有很多考慮因素。
揭仲認為，這次川習會不至於造成美中政策再次髮夾彎轉向全面合作，連中國也不認為有這樣的可能性。最明顯的證明是，中國與美國嘗試建構的「建設性戰略穩定關係」，其中未出現「夥伴」或「命運共同體」等字眼，代表雙邊還是有不小的分歧與疏離；且中國還強調「競爭有度的良性穩定」與「分歧可控的常態穩定」，代表中國與美國都承認雙邊長期戰略競爭的態勢不變，只是雙方都有共識在競爭過程中，需要管控風險，避免引發雙邊軍事衝突。 揭仲認為，川普政府雖然不會承認台灣是中國的勢力範圍，也不會同意中國可對台灣予取予求；但是川普政府對於犧牲一些台灣的利益，讓華府可降低風險，或從中國那邊換取利益，也不會有太多的猶豫。
/https://vip.udn.com/vip/story/121160/9511863?from=vipudn_maincate_latest
《當和平被摧毀：台海防衛戰略》，以4種中國侵台情境為想定主軸，延伸超過10個關鍵議題，深入探討兩岸一旦發生戰事，台灣將如何因應與自處。
第一集〈東風飛彈來襲〉聚焦共軍首波飛彈飽和攻擊，推演台灣哪些關鍵設施，可能成為首要攻擊目標。面對威脅，國軍該如何因應？「台灣之盾」又將如何發揮關鍵作用？必要時，台灣是否能夠進行源頭打擊，藉此削弱敵方後續攻勢？
節目將透過兵棋推演，邀集軍事專家，一同推敲共軍侵台樣態；同時，結合各領域專家學者訪問，與主持人外景口述，模擬戰爭逼近時的關鍵抉擇。 (文字說明與圖片擷取自 華視新聞 我想問的是….. Youtube 頻道 )
川習會剛結束，華府對台軍售卻突然陷入沉默。140億美元軍售案，究竟會如期推進、延後宣布，還是出現新的變數？台灣之盾後續發展，又會受到哪些影響？另外，國軍新接裝的M1A2T戰車與M109A7自走砲，未來若面對中國大陸主力裝甲部隊與無人機戰場環境，戰力定位與實際效能又該如何評估？，我們邀請到「國防安全研究院委任副研究員 揭仲博士」帶大家深入解析！(圖片擷取自SMARTnews Youtube 頻道 )
揭仲指出，美國行政部門今年一月就向美國國會領袖非正式簡報，若川普貿然取消全案，勢必面臨國會非常大的反彈。然而，川習會剛落幕，雙方才剛鉅細靡遺討論過台灣議題，習近平九月還要訪問華府，美中在這段期間可能還會再有新一波貿易採購。因此，就算川普政府沒取消軍售案，推遲可能性也不低，或者切割案項，先通過一部分，其餘的等到美國期中選舉後再宣布。
第二波軍購案可能延遲半年。揭仲分析，第二波軍售清單可能包括整合式反無人機系統、愛國者三型防空飛彈、NASAMS中低空防空飛彈及增補反戰車飛彈庫存等項目，假如公布期程延後，自然影響軍購案的正式啟動時間和排隊順序，尤其若無法及時搭上某些生產批次，就可能造成交貨時間比原本預期更晚。
他指出，尤其對「台灣之盾」的建構步驟之一，就是搭配第二批軍購的「增程型愛國者三型飛彈」同步引進IBCS整合防空作戰指揮系統，並以IBCS為核心，嫁接整合國內現有的美製防空感測系統。若延後到位，代表我方開始整合美製防空系統的時程將會延後。尤其在波灣戰事爆發之後，美軍、中東各國以及歐洲國家對於愛國者、NASAMS等武器系統的需求大增，若錯過這班車，不但可能大幅延後，成本也可能大增。(圖片擷取自聯合新聞網網頁)
揭仲的國防與中共軍事專題研究 
近期迴響