目錄
中共首度宣稱與那國島周邊為管轄範圍
北京為何挑與那國島施壓
共軍對日本連續發動三波施壓行動
中共又開始擔憂台灣可能調整南海主權主張
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中共施壓的工具，除原本的海警與海巡等公務船，共軍機艦自6月6日起也開始加入對日本施壓；施壓的區域也從台灣東部EEZ海域與釣魚台周邊，擴大到與那國島及沖繩島周遭海域，更在6月11日上午，派出二艘隸屬三沙綜合執法支隊的大型公務船，侵入南沙太平島禁止水域，最近時距太平島僅2.1浬，創下中共公務船刻意侵入太平島周邊禁限水域的首例。
中共將施壓範圍擴大到與那國島和太平島，似乎顯示北京開始擔心台灣為了「倚外謀獨」，在台灣東部、甚至南海主權主張上做出讓步。
至於中共為何要推翻行之有年的默契，派大型公務船侵入太平島禁止水域，不排除是台灣外交部在日菲宣布啟動劃界談判後，第一時間表示「肯定」的作法，被中共認定為台灣不惜在相關海域的爭議問題上讓步，以換取日菲協助台灣「倚外謀獨」；在海峽兩岸官方嚴重缺乏互信的情況下，遂使北京開始擔心日後台灣政府對南海，會不會也和台灣東部的EEZ一樣，願意調整主權主張，來換取美國、日本和菲律賓的支持，以推動北京眼中的「倚外謀獨」。
一旦中共常態化派公務船進入太平島禁限制水域巡弋，恐怕會引發連鎖效應，連帶導致越南與菲律賓等國，也大舉增加派公務船前往同一海域的頻率，使太平島周遭海域的情勢出現重大變化。國安單位應未雨綢繆，針對可能發生的狀況預做準備。
The article I published on June 5 in Storm Media now has an English version, with the title adjusted to “Beijing’s Maritime Legal War Reaches Taiwan’s Eastern Waters." Please refer to it for further details.
北京川習會落幕後，根據美國川普總統的發言，將高達140億美元的對台軍售案視為談判籌碼，並表示暫緩決定。此話一出，隨即引發台海高度焦慮。
雖然美國國會與國務卿盧比歐隨後滅火，強調對台政策未變，但這筆包含增程型愛國者三型飛彈、國家先進地對空防空飛彈系統等關鍵裝備的延宕，究竟會對國軍防禦帶來哪些實質衝擊？面對中共軍機、軍艦的演習與威脅，我們又該如何因應？
本集特別邀請到淡江大學整合戰略與科技研究中心研究員揭仲，他曾擔任國會辦公室主任長達17年，其中15年在國防委員會與外交國防委員會，也是國防部「114年四年期國防總檢討」諮詢委員，將分析川普總統為何公開表示對台軍售，可能作為美國與中國的談判條件，以及這筆140億美元的軍售案的內容，及對台灣防禦的關鍵影響。
此外，更從軍售延遲之際，台灣本身可以採取的因應作為，包括軍售之外爭取商售的可能性，以及無人機防禦的自主研發和部署等，提出見解。並深入剖析華府當前對台海軍事衝突風險的態度，建言台灣可以扮演的角色。歡迎收聽！
中共外交部發言人毛寧6月2日的談話，極可能意味著中共不排除利用這個事件，持續對日菲二國施壓，希望能迫使日菲二國就劃界所衍生的相關事宜，與中共、而非我方談判，建立其管轄權及於臺灣東部海域的新事證；並進一步藉區域各國是與北京談判的事實，將原本僅針對臺灣的矮化性法律戰，轉變為針對中華民國國際人格的國際性法律戰。
中共也很可能想藉機以抗議、反制日菲片面談判劃界為由，開始派海警船編隊，以每個月至少幾次、每次至少持續一定時間的模式，常態化進入台灣東面、我方專屬經濟海域卻遭日菲納入談判範圍的海域巡弋。換言之，中共想利用此一情形，伺機建立在臺灣東部、我方依《國際海洋法公約》主張的專屬經濟海域範圍，常態化巡弋甚至執法等「管轄」的事實，將侵蝕我方管轄權的法律戰行動範圍，擴張到臺灣東部我方的專屬經濟區海域。(圖片擷取自風傳媒網頁)
The remarks made by Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning(毛寧) on June 2 likely indicate that the China does not exclude the possibility of using this event to continue applying pressure on Japan and the Philippines. The aim is to compel these two countries to negotiate related matters arising from the delimitation with the China, rather than with Taiwan, thereby establishing new evidence of its jurisdiction in the eastern waters of Taiwan. Furthermore, by leveraging the fact that regional countries are negotiating with Beijing, this could transform the originally Taiwan-targeted degrading legal warfare into an international legal warfare aimed at undermining the international persona of the Republic of China.
The China may also seek to use this opportunity to protest against and counter the unilateral delimitation negotiations by Japan and the Philippines by beginning to deploy Coast Guard vessels in a manner that normalizes their patrols in the waters off Taiwan’s eastern coast—areas that Taiwan claims as its EEZ but which have been included in the negotiation scope by Japan and the Philippines. In other words, the China aims to exploit this situation to establish a routine presence of patrols and even law enforcement within the scope of Taiwan’s EEZ in the eastern waters, thereby expanding the legal warfare actions that erode Taiwan’s jurisdiction into these areas.
Chung Chieh(揭仲) provided an example, stating that the P&A data is equivalent to a quotation submitted by potential vendors, while the LOA draft is the contract draft during formal negotiations between the two parties. Both sides can negotiate the items, amounts, and payment milestones in the LOA draft before finalizing and signing it. Once the LOA is signed, the U.S. government will represent the purchasing country in subsequent processes such as vendor selection, negotiation, production, and delivery.
The advantage of this system is that the U.S. government will execute project management for the purchasing country; however, the downside is that it excludes certain clauses found in general commercial contracts, such as dispute resolution and arbitration mechanisms, primarily to facilitate the operations of U.S. administrative departments.
He noted that prior to Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, the U.S. insisted that Taiwan’s military procurement procedures must begin with a request for P&A. If the U.S. agreed to provide P&A, it would signify interdepartmental review and consent to sell. Taiwan would then plan its budget and apply for the LOR for LOA based on the P&A. However, since 2016, the U.S. has allowed Taiwan to skip the P&A stage and directly apply for the LOA draft when necessary.
He interpreted that the M1A2T budget exceeding nearly 5 billion NTD is due to the Army’s procurement process for the M1A2T, which aimed to expedite the project by skipping the LOR for P&A stage and relying on price data previously presented in a military exchange meeting. This approach overlooked significant price fluctuations over the years without obtaining a formal quotation, resulting in an underestimated budget. (圖片擷取自聯合報數位版)
/https://vip.udn.com/vip/story/121160/9544803?from=vipudn_maincate_main2
Chung Chieh (揭仲) indicated that further actions should not be ruled out, including more frequent incursions by Chinese Coast Guard vessels into Taiwan’s eastern waters. The heightened activity aims to create opportunities for negotiations with Japan and the Philippines. Taiwan also has the right to assert its claims over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and should negotiate with Japan and the Philippines, emphasizing the necessity of defending its interests.
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On June 2, Chung Chieh (揭仲), an adjunct assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, analyzed for the Central News Agency that Chinese Coast Guard vessels have previously operated in Taiwan’s eastern waters. Beijing is using this incident to strengthen its patrol intensity, aiming to engage in a legal battle against Taiwan by asserting “One China” across the Taiwan Strait and claiming sovereignty and jurisdiction over Taiwan.
He noted that Beijing has been working to eliminate jurisdictional gaps in its claims, such as areas east of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and restricted waters around Taiwan’s offshore islands. Through this incident, Beijing aims to establish precedents for exercising jurisdiction in the relevant maritime areas via actual actions such as patrols; the emphasis on “first independent actions” serves more of a propaganda purpose.
Chung Chieh(揭仲) stated that the backbone of the Taiwanese military’s artillery in the future will consist of 111 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), 60 M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, and several International Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (IFATDS). If the Ministry of National Defense confirms this year to send a combined arms battalion and regional command to form a brigade command group to participate in the annual “Western Strike” field artillery and high-intensity combat exercises in the U.S., the intention should be to enable Taiwanese field troops and command personnel to gain an in-depth understanding of modern ground combat dynamics and processes.
Chung Chieh(揭仲) believes that sending field troops and command officers to the U.S. for the “Western Strike” exercises before acquiring the M109A7 self-propelled howitzers and IFATDS will not only shorten the time required for these units to become combat-ready once the equipment arrives but will also allow the Taiwanese ground forces and field commanders to practically understand how the kill chain in modern ground combat operates and the extent of current deficiencies within the Taiwanese military. This experience will enable these personnel to return home as advocates for innovation, accelerating the reform and modernization of the army.
Furthermore, Chung Chieh(揭仲) recommended that, given the severe inadequacy of artillery firing ranges on the main island of Taiwan, and considering the significantly increased range of the M142 HIMARS and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers, it is difficult to conduct live-fire training under tactical scenarios on Taiwanese land. Therefore, the Ministry of National Defense should negotiate with the U.S. to adopt a model similar to that of the Air Force’s Luke Air Force Base, retaining some M142 HIMARS and M109A7 self-propelled howitzers in the U.S. Each year, personnel could be sent to the U.S. to utilize these retained assets for advanced tactical training and testing. This approach would not only enhance training effectiveness and assimilate new knowledge but also deepen bilateral exchanges between ground forces. (Image sourced from the digital edition of the United Daily News.)
至於川普為何游移不定，除對等關稅失效與美伊戰爭懸而未決，使華府談判地位受挫；更重要的是中共看準川普因美伊戰爭導致國內支持率下挫、連共和黨的基本盤都受衝擊的情況下，使川普能否從北京帶回大單，對提振共和黨期中選舉選情的重要性上升；加上到今年底前，包括9月24日習近平回訪華府，川普和習近平預計將再碰面三次，使中共可藉由將大筆採購清單分階段承諾、分階段兌現的方式，對今年底前的美台政治與軍事交流，包括軍售，獲致令白宮難以忽視的影響力。
除200架波音客機與重新開放美國牛肉比較明確，其餘僅是意願表達，後續還需經過一系列的磋商，逐步將農產品、石油、液化天然氣和能源的採購明細與數量明確化，才能對共和黨期中選舉的選情產生助益；川普之所以建議習近平9月24日造訪華府，也是考量習若同意，在出發前有可能讓前述採購清單明確化，當作給川普的伴手禮；將時間訂在9月中下旬，是為了有足夠的時間，將這些大單的效應轉化為選票。
值得注意的是，客機、發動機、農產品與能源採購所影響的區域，多數是川普及共和黨的基本盤；且共和黨目前在總數435席的聯邦眾議院佔有220席，只比民主黨的215席多出5席，比過半數所需的218席更僅多出2席。倘若共和黨於11月3日聯邦眾議員全數改選時，在基本盤與原本具優勢的選區意外輸掉3席，就將失去對眾議院的控制。使中共的大單效應可否在9月底前開始發酵，就可能對共和黨能否繼續掌控參眾兩院、即川普能否繼續「完全執政」，造成直接的影響。(圖片擷取自風傳媒網頁)
揭仲認為，川普的發言影響，應該遠不及杜魯門對華關係白皮書、1978年中美斷交等重要歷史轉折。揭仲解釋，目前的轉變，很大程度來自川普的個人風格，在美中長期戰略競爭態勢難以改變的大環境下，等川普卸任就可能出現調整，未必會像那些歷史事件一樣，對之後很長一段時間的美中台三邊互動造成深遠影響，甚至成為華府的政策框架。但揭仲也提醒，中國之後一定會援引此次川普總統與習近平詳細討論對台軍售的先例，不斷要求後續的美國政府比照辦理，使這個改變確實比較可能長期化，但只要沒有落實為文字的聯合聲明或公報，後續的美國政府還是有許多彈性可以應對。
另一方面，美國貿易代表葛里爾受訪時提到，過去包括歐巴馬和小布希等前任美國總統，也有暫停軍售的先例，強調川普必須權衡許多因素。揭仲指出，從老布希總統到歐巴馬總統，美國在對台軍售方面，基本上都維持二大特點：第一，避免出售可讓台灣具備跨海打擊中國大陸陸地的武器系統，連技術輸出也設限；第二，在軍售程序上，為符合「非邦交國」身分所做的差異化處理，例如台灣不能隨時向美國提出軍售申請，華府對台灣的軍售申請也不會「隨收隨審」。這二大限制，到川普第一個任期內才明顯改變，至此美國對台軍售程序才基本「正常化」，我方可隨時透過美國在台協會提出軍售申請，華府收到後也會「隨收隨審」。
揭仲解讀，葛里爾所稱小布希與歐巴馬時期的「暫停軍售」，指的應是當年美國政府並未採「隨到隨審」，而是累積到一定程度時一次宣布，因此從2008到2016的馬英九政府時期，美方只宣布4次對台軍售，每次的項目、數額都很龐大，對於宣布的時機也會有很多考慮因素。
揭仲認為，這次川習會不至於造成美中政策再次髮夾彎轉向全面合作，連中國也不認為有這樣的可能性。最明顯的證明是，中國與美國嘗試建構的「建設性戰略穩定關係」，其中未出現「夥伴」或「命運共同體」等字眼，代表雙邊還是有不小的分歧與疏離；且中國還強調「競爭有度的良性穩定」與「分歧可控的常態穩定」，代表中國與美國都承認雙邊長期戰略競爭的態勢不變，只是雙方都有共識在競爭過程中，需要管控風險，避免引發雙邊軍事衝突。 揭仲認為，川普政府雖然不會承認台灣是中國的勢力範圍，也不會同意中國可對台灣予取予求；但是川普政府對於犧牲一些台灣的利益，讓華府可降低風險，或從中國那邊換取利益，也不會有太多的猶豫。
/https://vip.udn.com/vip/story/121160/9511863?from=vipudn_maincate_latest
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